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Abstract: Rarely do two clicks of a computer mouse incite widespread panic and create international
news. The incorrect assumption of a Hawaiian Emergency Management Agency warning officer on
January 13, 2018, led that officer to select an actual ballistic missile alert rather than a test alert option
from the agency’s computer interface dropdown menu. Further, presented with the option to confirm
his selection, said officer validated his choice. His actions would set in motion a chain of events
impacted drastically by heightened tension regarding U.S. relations with North Korea. This paper
applies the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method to the
Hawaii ballistic missile alert (BMA) event, aligning the individual components of the event, obtained
from the Hawaii Department of Defense report, with the respective performance shaping factors
detailed within the SPAR-H method framework.
Keywords: HRA, SPAR-H, Ballistic Missile Alert.

1. INTRODUCTION
Hawaiian residents were quickly warned of an incoming ballistic missile threat to Hawaii and advised
to seek shelter by one of three alert systems and two social media platforms. Despite subsequent
Facebook and Twitter announcements declaring the alert to be a false alarm, a period of 38 minutes
elapsed before the agency issued a false alarm alert. Investigations by the Hawaii Department of
Defense (HI-DOD) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), begun in the early days
following the incident, reported a history of reported workplace concerns regarding the warning officer
who issued the alarm [1, 2] as well as insufficient training, inadequate training records, and agency
operation failures.

2. BACKGROUND
Hawaii is the only state in the nation with a pre-programmed alert that can be quickly sent to wireless
devices in the event of a ballistic missile attack (BMA) heading toward the United States. Given anxiety
and uncertainty over U.S. relations with North Korea, the State of Hawaii had established a new series
of BMA drills through the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA) in September, 2017.
HI-EMA crew shifts were tasked with creating a simulated incident and executing a corresponding drill
at a minimum of three times during the week [2]. These BMA drills were carried out successfully 26
times. On the day the false BMA was issued, a crew of six HI-EMA employees—four warning officers
and two supervisors—were in the building within the HI-EMA bunker in the Diamondhead crater on
the Hawaiian island of Oahu.
For this paper, the research team analyzed the initial investigation documents, identified the individual
factors contributing to the failures and employed the Standardize Plant Analysis Risk-Human (SPARH) human reliability analysis (HRA) method [3] to quantify the probability of these factors occurring
together to produce the overall event. SPAR-H works by assigning human error multipliers to the levels
of different performance shaping factors (PSFs). Though originally developed for use in the nuclear
industry, SPAR-H may be used for accident investigation and system redesign as well. The January,
2018, Hawaii event affords the opportunity for researchers to apply SPAR-H to a non-nuclear setting.
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3. EVENT DETAILS
At 8:00am on January 13, 2018, a “non-planned” or spontaneous drill was initiated at shift change at
the State Warning Point (SWP) location of the HI-EMA employee. While other warning officers
participating in the drill reported later that they fully understood this to be a drill, one warning officer
claimed to believe that this was a real emergency. The officer responded accordingly, selecting and
clicking a live alert from a dropdown menu, then clicking on a button labelled “yes” when prompted,
“Are you sure you want to send this Alert?” Thus, a live incoming BMA was issued and transmitted
from HI-EMA at 8:08am via the Emergency Management Systems (EMS), Commercial Mobile Alert
(CMA), and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) systems as well as Twitter and Facebook social
platforms [2]. The alerts were received over television, radio, and cellphones in Hawaii almost
immediately, with the message stating that there was an incoming ballistic missile threat to Hawaii,
advising residents to seek shelter with emphasis that the message was not a drill. Within a few short
minutes it was communicated across Facebook and Twitter that the alert was a false alarm with no threat
of a missile attack. However, it would be another 38 minutes before a second message was sent out
from HI-EMA denouncing the first alert. Table 1 displays the timeline of events from the initial alert to
the false alarm alert as reported in [2].
Table 1: Timeline of Events for Hawaii Ballistic Missile False Alarm [2].

Prior to the incident, little was communicated regarding the operations conducted within HI-EMA, nor
was there adequate insight into the relationship the agency shared with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). Following the events of January 13, the HI-DOD conducted a brief
preliminary investigation into the incident and released the following findings:





HI-EMA did not maintain comprehensive training records.
Despite replacing the software program in December, 2017, HI-EMA did not provide technical
training for SWP employees. Employees felt basic training provided was inadequate.
The BMA Checklist was characterized as vague, allowing workers to interpret the steps they should
follow differently.
On January 13, 2018, HI-EMA conducted the drill at change of shift, creating confusion regarding
who was in charge and which shift was responsible for carrying out the checklist.
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HI-EMA policy did not require a second person to sign off on alerts before they were sent.
HI-EMA lacked any preparation for how to correct a false warning, as it was not included within
the checklist.
HI-EMA Management had been aware for years that the employee who issued the BMA had
difficulties performing his job.
In the past, this same employee had mistakenly believed drills for tsunami and fire warnings were
actual events.
Colleagues had voiced concerns that they were not comfortable working with the employee.
HI-EMA Management supervisors counseled the employee, but he remained for a decade in a
position that had to be renewed each year.
HI-EMA was unaware of jurisdiction regarding alerts, specifically, that confirmation from FEMA
was not necessary prior to HI-EMA issuing a second “All Clear” alert.

Note that these findings should be considered as preliminary, since additional investigations are
ongoing. Initial media reports suggested that the event may have been the result of poor usability in the
alerting system. The HI-DOD’s internal report shifts the cause much more to individual culpability.
Such findings, which strongly point to a single individual, should be validated by external sources to
ensure the individual has not served as a scapegoat for more systemic problems in the organization and
process.

4. HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF EVENT
Humans are imperfect, and human error is an inevitable occurrence. Of course, not every human error
is consequential, but the potential for risk significant human errors must be considered. Human
reliability analysis (HRA) provides a means for identifying human failure events (HFEs) and
quantifying the probability of the events occurring as human error probabilities (HEPs). The
retrospective HRA detailed in this paper considers the likelihood that such an event would have
occurred or could occur again given similar context. The actual probability of the event is, of course,
100%, since it did occur, but that does not address the likelihood of future events.
We begin with the consideration of the major tasks or steps involved in this event. The simplified event
tree in Figure 1 below illustrates the three essential steps for an alert to be issued. First the operator
must receive the signal to initiate an alert. Second, the operator then initiates the event through software,
and third the software queries the operator to confirm the issuance of the event and, if confirmed, the
alert is sent.
Figure 1: Simplified Event Tree for Sending Drill Alert.

select and
initiate
proper alert

correct alert
confirmed
OK

receive
alert

FAIL
FAIL

As designed and from a human factors perspective, this is a very straight-forward process. Essentially
the operator needs to perceive the instruction/command that an alert signal should be sent, and then
send the correct alert signal. The confirmation step is actually a recovery step where, if the alert
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initiation was made inadvertently, it could be stopped. However, as presented in the HI-DOD
preliminary investigation, substantial evidence exists for less than adequate PSFs for the essential steps.
The next step in the process is to quantify the probability of each of the steps in the event tree. The HRA
quantification method employed, the SPAR-H method [3], is an approach developed to support plantspecific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).
The SPAR-H method was originally used by the U.S. NRC as a tool to carry out post-event analysis.
Dissecting the Hawaii event similarly affords the opportunity to create a model of the system from a
failure perspective that can inform improvements to the process including models of recovery. It can
also serve to inform as to where the weak links are in such human machine systems that can be corrected.
In the next section we will illustrate quantification using SPAR-H. We will begin with a brief
explanation of the SPAR-H method.
Table 2: Definitions of the SPAR-H PSFs (Summarized from [3])


Available Time: the amount of time that an operator or a crew has to diagnose and act upon an
abnormal event.
Stress and Stressors: negative as well as positive motivating forces of human performance that
impede the operator or crew from completing a task.
Experience and Training: the experience and training of the operator(s) involved in the task and
experience of the individual or crew.
Complexity: the difficulty of the task to be performed in the given context.
Ergonomics (including the Human-Machine Interface): the equipment, displays and controls,
layout, quality and quantity of information available from instrumentation, and the interaction of
the operator/crew with the equipment to carry out tasks.
Procedures: the existence, use and quality of formal operating procedures for the tasks under
consideration.
Fitness for Duty: whether or not the individual performing the task is physically and mentally fit
to perform the task at the time.
Work Processes: aspects of doing work, including inter-organizational, safety culture, work
planning, communication, and management support and policies.










5. HUMAN ERROR AND SPAR-H BASICS
A SPAR-H analysis is carried out in the following manner:






A determination is made if the situation represents an “At Power” or “Low Power and
Shutdown” event. This delineation is only applicable to nuclear power scenarios, and most nonnuclear activities, including the present analysis, would assume the equivalent of “At Power”
activities and use the corresponding SPAR-H worksheet.
A determination is made whether the activity is Diagnosis and/or Action, which provides
nominal (i.e., default) HEPs. Diagnosis refers to cognitively engaging activities like checking
monitors or making decisions. Action refers to those activities involving some form of physical
activity like pushing a button. The nominal HEP for diagnosis is 0.01, and the nominal HEP for
action is 0.001. When there is the influence of both Diagnosis and Action, the individual HEPs
are summed.
The influence of PSFs is determined and the appropriate level assigned. PSFs can have
negative, neutral, and positive influences. A negative influence has a multiplier greater than 1,
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which increases the HEP from the nominal value. A neutral influence has a multiplier equal to
1, which does not change the HEP. A positive influence has a multiplier less than 1, which
decreases the HEP. SPAR-H considers eight PSFs, shown in Table 2. More complete
definitions of each factor and levels may be found in [3]. The product of all eight PSFs is
multiplied by the nominal HEP to produce the basic HEP.
Where applicable, the basic HEP is corrected for dependency between successive HFEs. The
dependency concept is that an initial error increases the likelihood of subsequent errors. Where
dependency exists, it is treated as a mathematical anchor to increase the HEP for successive
errors.

6. SPAR-H ANALYSIS OF EVENTS
Crucial to this analysis is the assessment of the PSFs for each of the events and tasks. Table 3 displays
the information provided by HI-EMA as it aligns with the eight PSFs of SPAR-H. This information was
then used to determine the level of each PSF for each the three tasks in the event tree.
Next, quantification was completed using the SPAR-H worksheet for each of the steps in the event tree.
The “Alert initiation” and the “Alert confirmation” steps are each composed of both SPAR-H task
types—a diagnosis/decision component and an action component—so each of those steps requires two
SPAR-H worksheets. The “Alert signal received” step only has the action worksheet. The completed
worksheets are not included in this paper due to space constraints, but Table 4 below shows the assigned
PSF multiplier values by action and final failure probabilities. Note that a multiplier of 1 suggests that
there is no documented effect for that PSF.
Of particular interest in Table 4 are the PSFs and weights for experience/training, procedures, and
ergonomics/human-machine interface (HMI). The information provided by the HI-DOD investigation
clearly presented a picture where the training was poor, the particular operator involved had a history
of error, there were poor procedures, and the HMI actually presented conflicting information regarding
whether it was a drill or not, not to mention the poorly designed interface itself. Essentially it is a worst
case scenario.
Obviously if we were not modeling this specific event and operator the overall failure rate would be
lower, as we would not have specific knowledge about the operator’s poor performance record;
however, we would have the information regarding the lack of clear procedures, no signoffs for checks
and balances, and a poorly designed interface that could lead to inadvertent error. Of critical importance
here is the fact that the operator did receive some conflicting information, ostensibly did not perceive
that this was in-fact a drill, and there was an insufficient recovery mechanism. The recovery
mechanism, as designed, did present the opportunity for the operator to cancel the alert, but there were
no second eyes or supervisory involvement to ensure a reconsideration of the decision. Somewhat
unique to this incident is the world political environment with the high tension at the time between
North Korea and the U.S. that may have increased the stress level as well as contributing to the
believability that an actual attack was occurring. Also recent changes in the operations regarding the
interface with no substantive training impacted the usability of the HMI.

7. CONSIDERATION OF TEAM FACTORS
The majority of widely used HRA methods including SPAR-H model human errors carried out by
individuals or crews acting as a single entity, rather than within the context of those working in teams.
Additionally, HRA models focus mainly on PSFs that affect the individual’s cognition (stress,
procedures, etc.) with little work centered on teamwork (leadership, perceptions and actions of other
team members, etc.), team challenges and how these affect the quantification of HEPs. The Hawaii
incident is a good example of how lack of mutual awareness, defined as “knowledge of what other team
members are doing, how they are doing it, as well as how and when they can affect each other’s
activities” [4] can create opportunities for team errors.
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Table 3: PSFs Aligned with Reported HI-DOD Issues
PSFs

HI-DOD Issues

Stress or
stressors

● Stress and anxiety created by recent North Korea nuclear attack concerns.
● Drills were a recently added training exercise.
● Drills were administered spontaneously.

Experience and
training

● Employee was a 10-year veteran of the agency and a supervisor.
● Standard practice test conducted during each shift change three times a day
were not yet routine enough to be predictable, but they were not entirely
new.
● Employees had not been trained on the new FEMA software currently
being used.
● No records maintained for employee training and to what degree.

Ergonomics or
HMI

● Interfaces had not been updated.
● File names were very similar with little distinction between the test missile
alert and the genuine missile alert.

Procedures

● The recording does not follow the script contained in HI-EMA’s standard
operating procedure for this drill.
● Recorded message was incorrectly interpreted as part of an unscheduled
drill.
● “The day-shift manager was not prepared to supervise the morning test,”
the FCC said.
● Following standard procedures, the night-shift supervisor posing as Pacific
Command played a recorded message to the emergency workers warning
them of the fake threat. The message included the phrase “Exercise,
exercise, exercise.” But the message inaccurately included the phrase “This
is not a drill.”

Fitness for duty

● Reports stated that Hawaii emergency management officials knew for years
that the employee had problems performing his job.
● In the past, the employee in question had mistakenly believed drills for
tsunami and fire warnings were actual events.
● Colleagues reported not feeling comfortable working with the individual.
● Supervisors had counselled the employee repeatedly, yet retained him for a
decade in a position that had to be renewed each year.
● During the drill, the employee reported that he did not hear the word
“exercise” repeated six times. All of the fellow officers participating in the
drill confirmed that they had clearly heard the word “exercise” during the
drill.

Work processes

● FEMA and HI-EMA did not have clear policies for issuing alerts. HI-EMA
waited for permission to issue a second alert stating that the first alert was a
false alarm. According to FEMA, this was not a requirement.
● The agency had a vague checklist for missile alerts, allowing workers to
interpret the steps they should follow differently.
● HI-EMA Managers didn’t require a second person to sign off on alerts
before they were sent.
● The agency lacked any preparation on how to correct a false warning.
● New computer software programs had been added to the agency’s
computers but no training had been conducted to teach officers how to
apply it.

Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM 14, September 2018, Los Angeles, CA

Table 4: PSF Values per Action and Final Failure Probabilities
PSF

PSF Multiplier by Step and Task Type

Supporting
information

Correct
Alert
Confirmed/
Disconfirmed
Diagnosis

Correct
Alert
Confirmed/
Disconfirmed
Action

1

Select
&
Initiate
Proper
Alert
Action
1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

Complexity

1

1

1

1

1

Experience/
Training

3

10

3

10

3

Procedures

5

20

5

20

5

Ergonomics/
HMI

10

50

10

50

10

Fitness for
Duty

1

1

1

1

1

Work
Processes

5

2

5

2

5

.43

.99

.43

.99

.43

Receive
Drill
Alert
Signal
Action

Select &
Initiate
Proper
Alert
Diagnosis

Available
time

1

Stress/
Stressors

Failure
Probabilities

Time assessed to be
nominal—enough to
execute task
Stress was assessed as
high—due to level of
perceived threat and
error consequence
Complexity was
assessed as nominal—
task is straight-forward
Low—no
comprehensive record of
training, prior similar
errors, no training on
software
Incomplete—checklist
was characterized as
vague, no sign-offs
Poor—poorly designed
system and no training
for alert signal, and
actions for alert
initiation and
confirmation—for
diagnosis, information
providing was
conflicting, making it
misleading
Nominal—insufficient
information to judge
operator condition
Poor—job performance
issues not dealt with, no
shift turnover protocol`
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Team and teamwork/communication errors are distinct from individual human errors since they can be
affected by mutual awareness, dependency of individuals on each other, as well as information
transmitted within team members due to the complex and dynamic nature of the environment. The HIDOD investigation described the employee who sent out a false alert as not showing initiative and
mentioned that there were issues related to morale and poor performance evaluations for some of the
employees including the officer who issued the false alert. Poor team dynamics can affect individual
and team performance. During the Hawaii incident, the officer identified earlier incorrectly diagnosed
the situation from the available information and arrived at a different conclusion than his crewmembers.
As a result, he failed to resolve the differences and failed to communicate both his decision-making and
his subsequent intentions, leading to error—the elicitation of the false alert. Lack of training and detailed
procedures as well as a complex event also caused the crew to address the issue incorrectly.
The success or failure to perform the drill depended on the crew’s diagnoses, actions and their ability
to work as a team. This is important for efficient and effective utilization of their experience and training
to address the issue and mitigate the team errors that could contribute to the risk. HRA methods are not
able to account for team performance in the modeling and quantification of the HEPs, which affects the
validity and accuracy of the estimations.
The Hawaii incident provides an opportunity to examine human error from a team rather than an
individual perspective. Further information examining the impact mutual awareness has on team
operations is forthcoming.

8. CONCLUSION
The events which occurred in Hawaii in January, 2018, provide another clear example of how failures
occur in complex technological systems. This paper provides a unique perspective and analysis of the
events contributing to the BMA false alarm. As demonstrated within this paper, the SPAR-H method
has far reaching applications beyond its initial nuclear power plant origins. Information obtained within
the HI-DOD report was aligned with the eight PSFs of SPAR-H. Relying upon the SPAR-H capabilities
for identifying and quantifying failure probabilities, SPAR-H catalogued the key contributing factors
to the incident and weighted the event as high likelihood given the context.
Disclaimer
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